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SUMMARY
The attached report on the activities of the body of officials responsible for controls in the
wine sector that the Commission is to present to the Council and to the European Parliament
covers the period between 1 May 1992 and 31 December 1994.
The work of Commission inspectors has covered several major areas: permanent
abandonment, control of harvest and production declarations, and the yield per hectare of
quality wines psr, to cite only the most important.
The report sets out in detail the inspectors' obseryations on the application of these measures.
Their main conclusions are summarized below
The main observations with regard to the control of permanent abandonment established
by the Member States were that, when checks are made outside the vines' growing period,
the productive capacity of the vines cannot be assessed; the yields of grubbed-up parcels are
often purposely overestimated; annual declarations are often ignored and grubbing operations
are often incomplete (stocks not completely removed).
The control of harvest and production declarations revealed the following major problems:
derogations from the requirement to sr"rbmit a harvest cleclaration when the harvester supplies
the whole of the harvest to a wine maker, allowing changes to the areas concerned and
therefore to the yields; the negligence to cover interrnediate harvesting centres in the
regulations meaning that they do not need to draw up declarations; the lack of a vineyard
register indicating the actual composition of vineyards (cadastral parcels) from which the
products are harvested.
The measures adopted by the Member States to restrict yiclds of quality wines psr
undermine in several ways the principle accorcling to which an overrun of the maximrrm per-
hectare yield results in the Ioss of the appellation for the whole harvest, the principal being:
fixing high maximurn yields, irrespective of yields over the previous ten years; systernatic
recourse to "exceptionat" years, from the point of view of climatic conditions, to justify
increasing yields; the lack of uniformity between Merriber States as regards the legal uses of
production above the thresholcls.
The other conclusion that can be drawn from the enquiries carried out is that the
control procedures set up by the Mcmber States to ensure correct application of
Community rules are inadequate.
This results from the lack of human and material resources devoted to controls and to their
dispersal around several organizations, the coordination of which is limited and, in certain
cases, non-existent.
It must be recognized that the legislation acloptecl since the establisliment of the conrnron
organization of the rnarket (COM) in wine, and the cornplenrentary national legislation, is
extrernely complex, reflecting the complexity of the sector itself. /
The use of certain instrumentS, e.g. the vineyard register, designed to provide the
information necessary to irnprove the eff'ectiveness of controls, on which work has still not
been completed or, in certain cases, even begun, rernains lirnited, for reasons which the
Commission has decided to investisate in the cornins weeks bv rneans of a full auclit.
In its proposal for a Regulation on the reform of the common organization of the market in
wi:ne, the Commission stressed that effective Community control of compliance with the
rules and commitments made was a necessary condition for the success of the reform. It also
emrphasized that implementation of the reform had to be accompanied by the drawing up of
a simplified vineyard register allowing to control the accuracy of declarations of area devoted
to wine growing (COM (94) 1I7 ftnal, Titles IX and X).
The importance of establishing a Community corrtrol structure is also recognized by the
European Parliamentr which, after examining the Commission's first report (to the Council
and to Parliament) on the activities of the body o.f officials responsible for controls in the
wirle sector, approved without reservation the Commission's conclusions and stated that:
- "the Commission's body of specific officials rnust be strengthened by making provision
for more specialists within the wine sector";
- "the body should be set up on a permanent footing with a proper status which will
guarantee its officials a long-term career";
- "the body must be given the technical resources (reference laboratories) and funds
which will directly help to reduce EAGGF expenditure by cutting back on unlawful
premiums, aids and interventions".
Despite the efforts of the Directorate-General for Agriculture to develop the body of offrcials
for controls in the wine sector, sef up by Regulation (EEC) No 2048/89, the current situation
is l"ar from satisfying the demands of the European Parliament, the difficulties being linked
essentially to the precarious status of the personnel and, above all, to the lack of posts
allocated to the body. The control body has been maintained, with two ofhcials only, by
allocating to it the posts of two permanent officials normally allocated to the EAGGF for
other control work.
Gi.ren the limited staff and resources available, the control body is unable to carry out the
tasks currently assigned to it by the Council.
Th,e reform of the COM cannot be implemented without a reinforcement of Community
controls on the smooth and uniform application of measures adopted to correct the current
imbalance in the sector.
Thre Commission is convinced of this, and Parliament, in its resolutionz on the Commission
cornmunication to the Council on the development and future of wine sector policy (COM
(93) 380 final), reiterates its point of view, stressing that "in order to guarantee the success
of the reform and to ensure that wine-sector regulations are enforced in a consistent way, it
is essential for controls to be placed on a systematic basis by setting up a central Community
arbitration laboratory and strengthening the Community's bocly of control officers so that,
equipped with the necessary human and materinl resources, they lvill be able to rvork
tog;ether with national and regional authorities, carrying out operations related to the
toJ No c 20,24.1.1994, p. 511.
'oJ No c 91, 28.3.19t)4, p. 55.
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inspection and the suppression and punishment of fraud." Parliament also added that an
operative viticultural land register should be introduced and the change in the areas under
vines monitored by means of aerial photographic surveying. Hence the importance of the
Commission's proposal on the vineyard register.
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PREFACE
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 of 19 June 1989 laying down general rules on
controls in the wine sectort instituted a Community control body and laid down the
requisite legal foundations for its activity. This Community control body was actually set
up within the EAGGF, as the latter is responsible for all agricultural inspections, in May
1991.
Its members were recruited from specialized officials working in the national
inspectorates. The turn-over of the Community control body's staff over its
two-and-a-half years of operation has been considerable, due to their precarious status
(auxiliaries) and the one-year limit on their contracts imposed by the Cornmission. The
very small number of staff assigned to this body and their precarious status has
considerably weakened the Community control body's role. Nevertheless, many of'the
controls called for in the Regulation's appendix have been carried out.
In compliance with the provisions of Article 17(2) of the Regulation, the Coninission
submitted to the Council and European Parliament a first annual repclrt on tlie
Community control body's activities covering its first year of operation, i.e., frorn 1
May 1991 to 30 ApriI 1992 inclusive.2
This'document met with a generally very favourable reception in the Council ancl
Parliament, both of which agreed on the need to continue and irnprove the control body's
activities, notably by bolstering its administrative structurc and staff number and
improving exchange of inforrnation with the relevant national inspectorates. The
conclusions of the report met general agreenrent, especially as regards the need for
greater uniformity in the way the Member States carry out their controls.
This report was also analyzed in depth by the Management Committee for Wine, as part
of the periodic examination of progress made in checking wine sector activities laid down
in Article 17(l) of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89. Several more detailed reports on the
activities examined by the control body were presented to the national delegations at the
Committee's meeting.
The present report describes the Comrnunity control bocly's activities for the period of
operation from 1 May 1992 to 31 December 1994 inclusive.
'OJ No L202, 14.7.1989,2Document SEC(92) 2014
p.'32.
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1. InrnonucrroN
1.1. Regulations and Control
1. flhe wine sector can be singled out from the rest of the agrifood
sectors as requiring eomplex organization by the national
administrations to manage and control compliance with the battery
of viti- and vinicultural measures currently in existence. Quite
logically, this need is most acute in the wine-producing countries.
I'his situation is directly related to the scope and complexity of
Community vineyard and wine-making regulations and national
implementing regulations. Thus, several dozen Community sectoral
regulations - both basic legislation and amendments - were in force
in 1994.
Community regulations cover almost all of the areas affecting the
sector, whether the vineyarcl per se (land suitable for growing
wine, wine varieties, growing practices, and changes in production
potential) wine-making (harvesting and production, processing,
storage and circulation of the products, qualitative characteristics,
labelling, etc. ), intervention nleasures (structural measures, market
measures), trading, pricing, etc. The result is a huge tangle of
interlocking regulations which operators have to comply with
however difficult it rnay be. If the regulations are to be simplified,
this is definitely an area ripe for such change. Indeed, the
proposed reform of the Common Organization of the Market
(COM) has just such an aim in mind.
The vulnerability of the wine regulations to fraud is consequently
great, not only because of the particular nature of the products
involved, which are easily adulterated or substituted, but also
because of the complexity of the regulations themselves, which
makes detection of such frauds more difficult. Indeed, the more
complicated a regulation, the harder it is to check compliance.
Moreover, the sector's operators enounter major difficulties in
complying with all of the provisions in effect, including the
provisions creating obligations to declare and register winery
operations. Indeed, many operators find themselves in a situation
in which they have unwittingly infringed these provisions.
2.
I.2. ImprovingControls
t. To cover all of the fronts on which infringements may occur, the
national authorities need to spread their efforts using sufficient
investigative means (e.g. specialized personnel and technical
back-up) and targeting the areas, aspects and operations for control
on the basis of a risk analysis.
Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 established the bases for improving
compliance with wine-sector rules. In short, this regulation:
pinpointed the areas of control that were considered
especially sensitive and on which the authorities responsible
for carrying out controls had to concentrate their efforts;
established that if controls were not conducted
systematically they had to be representative;
called for the authorities responsible for carrying out
controls to be given the staff needed"to perform inspections
efficaciously;
stipulated the powers that inspectors must have to do their
jobs well;
laid down rules for mutual assistance between the Member
States' various authorities; and finally,
created a Community control structure, attached to the
Commission, that was responsible for ensuring that the
wine regulations were applied uniformly in the Member
States.
Today, more than five years after the Regulation's entry into
force, some improvements have occurred, but they are of limited
scope and their effects have barely been felt.
Thr.rs, the Community control body has been set up and its
activities in all the Member States, especially in the producer
countries, have helped to dynamize the national authorities. In
addition, the Community control body's findings have brought to
light some cases of fraud and led to the correction of some
weaknesses in the regulations
The creation of liaison authorities in the various Member States
has somewhat improved interdepartmental coordination as well as
mutual cooperation between the authorities of different Member
States. Still, the lack of means of inspection, the restricted powers
of certain departments' inspectors, the lack of specialization in the
wine sector characterizing some of the authorities responsible for
control and the low degree of coordination achieved so far
considerabfy limit the scope and efficacy of controls.
2.
2. Th Colrym.urv coNTRoL BoDY
2.1. Tasks
2.2. Staff
Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 laying down general
the wine sector created within the Commission a
body of specific officials to'ensure the uniform
Member States of the rules in the wine sector.
rules for controls in
community control
application by the
This body's tasks cover all areas of the COM in wine, especially the
following aims:
collaborating with the competent authorities of the Member States
in controls scheduled by the national bodies or conducted at the
Commission's request;
evaluating the established control arrangements, inspection
procedures and findings, in order to contribute to the
harmonization of controls thrr:ughout the European Union; and
promoting cooperation and information exchange between the
authorities of the various Mernber States in order to contribute to
the uniform application of the wine rules and facilitate the
circulation of wine-sector products.
1. As the Council decided when approving Regulation (EEC) No.
2A48189, once the Community control body was set up (in 1991)
its mernbers were taken on as auxiliary staff under the EEC Staff
Regulations. While this arrangement has the advantage of making
it possible to recruit people with experience in conducting
inspections, auxiliary staff may not remain under contract for more
than a year.
Major problerns have developed as a result of this situation, i.e.:
The staff did not have enough time to hone their experience
and expertise over such a short period of time. By the time
they had been trained they had to leave the Commission.
It was difficult to recruit highly qualified, experienced
persons for such short-term contracts.
The Community control body's staff had to be changed
annually. This meant a break in continuity and additionally
wasted time for the EAGGF, which was also responsible
for recruitement.
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However, in 1993 the Community control body was given two
permanent staff positions and all the existing auxiliary posts were
eliminated. The Community control body is thus currently staffed
by only two people.
2. We can hope that this precarious situation will disappear. Indeed,
in its Communication to the Council of 22.7.1993 on the reform
of the COM in wine the Commission stressed the need to step up
controls in all areas of the proposed reform and to implement
scrupulously the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89.
This necessarily means increasing the Community control body's
staff.
In its examination of this Communication in 1993 the European
Parliament supported the activities carried out by the Community
control body and called upon the Commission to ensure the body's
perpetuation by increasing its staff considerably and giving them
a stable employment status. The Parliament considered that 36
officials were required.
2,3. Investigative powers
On paper, the Commission's specific officials have the same rights and
powers to carry out their work as their national counterparts, with a few
restrictions. Thus,
according to the rules, the Commission's officials do not have
autonomous powers, but collaborate in the controls organized by
the national authorities, which are also responsible for conducting
the surveillance. As in most cases the Community inspectors may
choose, or even propose, the operations in which they would like
to participate and have access to the premises and documents that
are useful for inspections on an equal footing with the national
inspectors, this lirnitation does not necessarily curtail their
investigative powers, provided, however, that the national officials
are willing to cooperate.
when samples are deemed necessary, the Community inspectors
must ask their national counterparts to take the samples. Once the
samples are collected, they remain at the disposal of the
Community officials. It is up to the latter to decide which
laboratory will analyze the samples and what tests must be
performed. Since the Commission officials are free to choose what
samples must be collected, this is merely a forrnal restriction.
another restriction results from the application of the principle of
the secrecy of preliminary inquiries in courts of law ("secret
d'instruction"), which exists in many Member States' legal
systems. This principle can limit Community officials'
investigative powers if it is invoked arbitrarily by a Member State
to block Community inspeetors when controls might reveal some
criminal violations. Since virtually any infringement of the
provisions for which the Community officials are responsible can
trigger a preliminary inquiry by the courts, such an attitude
renders the Communitv structure totallv ineffective.
2.4, Working methods
1. An annual programme of work specifying the areas for control and
missions to be undertaken is drawn up. The period in which the
controls are to take place is chosen for each specific area of
activity so as to dovetail with the national inspection seryices'
normal activities. The missions are divided up amongst the
countries according to each country's importance with regard to
the management of the malket and the merits of the subject being
covered.
Special unscheduled missions may be carried out within the
framework of mutual assistance between control authorities when
serious differences arise between Member States concerning
batches that fail to meet standards or when motivated suspicions
of wide-scale iregularities exist.
2. The frndings of each mission are sent to the Member State's
liaison authority with a request that its remarks be sent on to the
Commission.
Some cases come in for special internal follow-up, notably when
infringement of Community rules, frauds impinging on the
Community's budget or weaknesses or loopholes in the regulations
themselves are detected.
2.5. Missionsundertaken
In the period covered by this report the Commission officials conducted
a total of 73 missions in the Member States as listed in Annex I. Most of
the missions were planned under the Community control body's annual
programme of work; others were triggered by investigations launched by
the Community control body in response to information about purported
frauds received by the Commission; still others concerned bilateral
disputes that arose as a result of the detection of products that did not
conform to wine-sector rules. The Community control body also
contributed ideas on the reform of the COM.
Annex II to this report lists the findings and results by subject. How
mutual assistance between the various national control authorities
functioned and the Community control body's main activities in this area
are analyzed in Chapter 4.
2.6. Cooperation
The Community control body worked harmoniously and productively with
practically all of the Member States' control bodies. The national
authorities were willing to cooperate with the Community control body
and saw in the latter's creation and operation an opportunity to promote
and improve controls of the wine sector.
The Community inspectors also met with a favourable welcome from the
producers and their trade organizations. A11 parties seemed to recognize
the need for objective Community controls to protect the sector and, by
extension, defend their interests. Of course, contrary reactions were also
seen, notably from producers who were found to be perpetrating frauds.
3. TIru NITTONAL CONTROL STRUCT{.]RES
3.1. The types of authorities
1. National wine-sector control authorities and their powers differ
considerably frorn one Member State to the next, in line notably
with whether or not the Member State is a wine-producing country
and the countries' different internal administrative and political
structures.
2. In the wine-producing countries, up to seven authorities (or their
homologous services in the regions) are engaged in the
administrative management and control of the wine sector.
Despite the diversity within this group of Member States, their
relevant national authorities can be put into the following
categories overall:
a) offices in charge of vineyards: sometimes specialized but
usually responsible for all the other agricultural sectors as
well, these bodies manage and inspect the vineyards'
potentials, monitor any possible rnodifications (grubbing
up, replanting, new planting), implement structural
intervention neasures (grubbing up with premiums,
vineyard restructuring) and sometimes check harvest
declarations as well.
b) offices responsible for carrying out controls on wines:
Sometimes specialized in wines or including specialized
sections, but usually having oversight over all agrifood
products, these bodies are responsible for preventing and
suppressing agrifood fraud in general and wine-sector fraud.
in particular. They check the product in the various stages
of its production and wholesaling. They are responsible in
particular for checking the annual production and storage
declarations, the movement of goods, the proper keeping
of registers, oenological practices, wine quality and
labelling.
offices in charge of c;uality wines: These bodies check
designated wines; they sometimes have oversight over table
wines with indications of their places of origin and local
wines. They inspect both vineyards and wineries, checking
agricultural practices (vine varieties, growing methods,
yields per hectare, harvesting), production processes
(pressing, ageing, and bottling) and wine quality
(approval).
offices responsible for consumer protection: These bodies
check produce and foodstuffs for hygiene and freedom
from disease. The inr;pections of wine are carried out
primarily at the market stage and focus on product quality
and Iabelling.
agricultural intervention agencies: These agencies, which
are sometimes specialized in wine, are responsible for
i rnplementin g Com mun ity in terven tion measures and paying
out the corresponding aid. The inspections in connection
with the granting of aid are carried out by the intervention
agencies thenrselves, the vineyard authorities (structural
measures), or the offices or departments responsible for
carrying out controls (market measures).
miscellaneous specialized offices: These include offices
that monitor distilleries and the authorities responsible for
controling the commericialisation of vinous alcohol.
g) Customs: Customs inspections of wine are primarily
administrative (conformity of transport documents);
samples are occasionally taken.
The vineyard register offers il striking example of the different
bodies that are responsible for this instrument for verifying and
managing the wine-production potentials in the different Member
States:
c)
d)
e)
f)
r0
- in Germany: the vineyard register comes under the
jurisdiction of the L[nder (Hessen, Rhineland-Palatinate) or
regions (Unterfranken, Baden, Wiirttemberg), with
responsibility being delegated to research institutes (Baden
and Wtirttemberg), vineyard offices (Hessen), a local
administration (Unterfranken), and a chamber of
agriculture (Rhineland-Palatinate) .
- in France: the vineyard register comes under national
jtlrisdiction and is the responsibility of the Finance
Ministry (Customs).
- in Luxembourg: the Vine and Wine Institute manages the
register.
- in Italy: the vineyard register comes under national
jurisdiction (EIMA - an intervention agency) but its
constitution and management have been contracted out to
a private consortium.
- in Spain: responsibility for the vineyard register has just
been shifted from the national institute for wines of
designated origin, INDO, to Spain's Autonomous
Communities, but the actual realisation has been entrusted
to a private consortium.
- in Pprtugal: the vineyard register comes under nationaljurisdiction (Vine and Wine Institute).
- in $reece: the vineyard register comes under national
jurisdiction (Ministry of Agriculture), but does not actually
exist.
3. The non-producing Member States have as a rule a total of three
different authorities that carry out alniost all of the wine-sector
inspections. These entities are sirnilar to those described under
2(b), (d) and (g).
3.2. Operation
The foregoing review shows that diversity is the rule when it comes to the
authorities that are responsible for controls in the wine sector in the
Member States, with managerial and inspection powers shared and, alas,
sometimes overlapping. What is more, apart frorn a few rare exceptions,
the authorities in charge of the inspections are not specialized in the wine
sector, but handle many areas of activity and are responsible for verifying
operations in other sectors as well (e.g., agriculture, food, and consumer
goods). Finally, the inspectors' powers vary according to the body to
which they belong. Indeed, some offices act more like advisors to
producers, whereas others take a are more punitive line.
Each Member State also has a contact body that is responsible for liaising
between the Member State's various control services and the Commission.
In practice, however, inter-departmental coordination must clear major
hurdles resulting notably frorn the fact that the offices are supervised by
l1
various administrations (central, regional, and various ministerial
departments) and guided by different priorities of action.
Given these objective difficulties, satisfactory levels of inspection will be
achieved only if specific national bodies specialized in wine-sector control
are set up and endowed with broad investigative powers encompassing all
the areas covered by the regulation and sufficient powers and means to
carry out their tasks. This could be accomplished by bolstering one or the
other of the authorities that already exist, especially in the wine-producing
Member States.
3.3. Activities (general aspects)
l. Article 3'of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048189 states the principles
for improving wine-sector controls in the Member States, i.e. the
circumscription of the areas to be controled - more particularly,
ensuring that inspections are carried out according to criteria of
representativeness - and the need to have sufficient staff to carry
out the inspections efficaciously.
During its various missions the (lommunity control body collected,
more or less systematically, general documentation about the
national inspectorates' activitir:s, working procedures and field
staff.
It is clear that, for a given area, the inspections carried out by the
Member States' national ar"rthorities are far from uniform; the type,
intensity, and efficacy of the te'sts are not always the same.
2. In 1992, the Comrnission asl,red the liaison authorities in the
Twelve Member States to provide statistics on the inspections
carried out in 1991 and the programmes of work scheduled for
1992, by type of verification, the aim being to be able to assess
the distribution and intensity of the controls conducted in the
European Community. The Member States' responses concerning
their control statistics revealed that:
the preciseness of the infonnation furnished varied
considerably from one Member State to the next. Whilst
some countries provided detailed statistics broken down by
competent department and type of verifrcation, others kept
their responses brief.
it was extremely difficult to compare the statistics provided
by the various national authorities, especialiy given the
vagueness of the types of inspections carried out and the
methods or procedures.
In general, the infonnation about the national authorities' agendas
that was submitted to the Commission was limited to an or.rtline of
the priority areas in which inspections were planned. Rough
1aIL
schedules were sometimes attached, but they did not contain any
specific referenoes to the criteria of representativeness that were
to be met.
3. Achieving true Community-wide harmonization of wine-sector
control requires in-depth evaluation of the COM's control
requirements by specifrc area, a systematic inventory of all the
control procedures used by the various national services and,
finally, detailed knowledge of the staff assigned to carrying out
wine-sector inspections by department and by area. If the EAGGF
has the funds to call upon outside experts' services, it will
commission the relevant in-depth study in 1995. Moreover, the
national inspectorates' annual activity reports and programmes
should be transmitted to the Commission's departments annually,
as the Commission suggested in its COM reform proposal.
Last but not least, all the Member'States are amiss in that they
either have no working vineyard register, which is supposed to
cover all vineyard operations in compliance with Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 2392186 of 24 July 19861 and Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 649/87 of 3 March 19812, or, where such
. a register does exist, rarely use it for control pulposes.
4. Coopnru,noN BETwEEN THE NATIoNAL AUTI{oRITTES
4.L. The regulatory framework
4. 1.1. Mutual ossistance
Title IV of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 lays down how the competent
authorities in the various Member States are to assist each other. Two
types of procedures are established, one for 'assistance on request'
(Article 8), the other for 'spontanegus assistance' (Article 9). The
Commission's role is to foster infonnation exchange. To this end, it must
be informed of all the cases in which the marketing of a product may be
of specif,rc interest to other Mernber States or a product fails to conform
to wine-sector rules ((Article 8(1) and Article 9(2)).
4.1.2. Inforntation to be exchonged
According to Article 10 of the Regulation, when a Member State finds
that a product imported from another Meniber State does not comply with
wine-sector rules, the competent authorities shall provide each other with
information aboul the disputed product's composition and organoleptic
toJ No L 208,31.7.1986, p. 1.
2oJ No L 62,5.3.1987, p.10.
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characteristics, its designation and presentation, and how far it complies
with the rules laid down for its production and marketing. Moreover, this
information shall be accompanied by documents or other evidence and
details of any administrative measures or legal action relating thereto.
The authorities involved must subsequently inform each other without
delay of the progress of the investigations and any administrative or legal
action taken subsequent to the operations concerned.
4.1.3. Sampling
Commission Regulation (EEC) No.2347191 of 29 luly Iggl1 lays down
official rules for taking samples as part of the cooperation between the
Member States' competent authorities. The aim is to ensure that ofhcial
analyses are representative and their results verifiable throughout the
European Community (see the frrst recital).
4.1.4. Methods of Analysis
Article l4(l) of Regulation (EEC) No. 822187 requires the adoption of
methods of analysis to determine the composition of wine products and
rules for ascertaining whether the products have undergone processes
contrary to authorized oenologicaI practice.
Commission Regulation (EEC) No.2676190 of 17 September 19902 lays
down the Community test methods applying to the wine sector. In
addition, this Regulation specifies that, inasmuch as the Community has
not yet laid down maximum levels for substances whose presence
indicates that certain oenological practices have been used and has not yet
adopted tables enabling analysis data to be compared, the Member States
are authorized to set these limits thentselves (see the second recital).
Moreover, pursuant to Article 7aQ) of Regulation (EEC) No. 822187,
when methods of analysis or Cornmunity rules do not exist,
IWO-recognized or ISO-recommended methods shall apply. If neither of
the latter exist, an analytical method allowed by the Member State
concerned may be used or, if necessary, any other appropriate test
method, that is, a method that is accurate, repeatable and reproducible.
4.1.5. The Communiry rcst lahorarcry
Article 1.6 of Regulation (EEO No. 2048189 sripulares thar rhe
Commission shall set up an analytical data bank for wine-sector products
at the Joint Research centre (JRC) in Ispra. commission Regulation
toJ No L 214, 2.8.1991, p. 32.
lCJ No L 272,3.10.1990, p. 1.
l4
(EEC) No.2347191 of 29 luly 19911 lays down the rules for sampling
wine-sector products either within the framework of Member State
cooperation or for analysis by nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR),
including for the Community data bank. Commission Regulation (EEC)
No. 2348/91 of 29 luly 19912 sets out how the data bank for NMR test
results is to be set up and operated.
To meet these regulatory requirements the Commission has set up within
the JRC's Institute for the Environment a special section, the European
Office for Wine, Alcohol and Spirit Drinks (BEVABS), the main pu{pose
of which is to carry out the scientific and technical tasks that the
Commission requires to ensure that Community wine-sector legislation is
implemented and observed correctly. The BEVABS's creation was delayed
somewhat because of administrative problerns (hiring of qualifred staffl
and technical problems (divergent results of analyses conducted in the
Member States and checks performed at the JRC, notably due to the
calibration of instruments, different alcohol distillation systems, internal
reference standards, and failure to comply with the technical protocol).
Most of these difficulties have been overcome and'the data for the 1991
and 1992 wine years have just been validated by the scientific
subcommittee.
BEVABS has also participated in a study to detect the watering down of
wines by mass spectrometry (MS) analysis of the wine's 180/160 isotope
ratio and will supplement the existing NMR data bank with the isotope
ratios measured in the same samples.
The Office may also create a data bank containing the results of these
isotope distribution analyses, if need be.
Similarly, it is prepared to conduct most of the conventional analyses of
wines and spirits. This ability might lead to its arbitrating over litigious
analyses, if the Member States accept such a role for it.
4.1.6. The use onrl tlisposal oJ'proctucts not complying witlt wine-srctor
rulcs
Article 73(1) of Regulation (EEC) No. 822187 states that wine-sector
products that have been subjected to oenological practices not allowed by
Community regulations or, in their absence, national regulations, 'may not
be offered or disposed of for direct human consumption'. The same
applies to products that are not of sound and fair merchantable quality and
products that do not meet Community definitions.
Article 73(2) lays down the adoption of Cornmunity rr-rles governing the
holding, transport, and use of products that do not cornply with the
Regulation's provisions and criteria to avoid excessive hardship in
individual cases. No Community legislation to implement these provisions
has been adopted to date, despite the bilateral disputes that have arisen in
this area.
'oJ No L 21,4, 2.8.1.991, p.2oJ No L 214,2.8.1991, p.
32.
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Given the fact that, since I January 1993 customs procedures to turn back
goods can no longer be applied, the use or disposal of unauthorized
products is still not covered by binding rules. If a dispute arises, it is
always possible to ask for a counter-appraisal by laboratories that, until
now, had to be national. To ensure that justice is meted out more fairly,
it would be useful to use the BEVABS as a Communitv arbitration
laboratory.
4.2. Matters of contention
Since its creation the Community control body has acted as a clearing
house for the bilateral disputes sent to the Commission by national
authorities. The bulk of cases of which the Commission has been
informed concerned wine-sector products that were presumed to have
undergone illicit oenological practices in a Member State other than the
one that filed the complaint. Less frequently seen were irregular
presentations of wine.
Most of the files were opened by the German control authorities, followed
by the French. Most of the contested products come from Italy, followed
by Spain and France.
The Community control body has examined all the files and carried out
investigations of some suspect operators in order to verify on site the
conditions under which the consignments were bottled, manufactured, etc.
In addition, it contacted the national laboratories in order to shed light on
the interpretation of specific analytical results.
4.3. Remarks
Information exchange among the authorities of the various Member States
and between such ar.rthorities and the European Commission when
defective products are detected in a Member State other than the State of
production continues to be plagued by practical problems. The following
problems may be quoted:
a) The information does not always contain all the elements stipulated
in Article i0 of Regulation GfEC) No. 2048/89. What is more, it
is often not accompanied by documents or other useful pieces of
evidence that would enable the recipient control authorities to
follow up matters more effectively;
b) When products that do not conform to Community rules are sent
back to the Member State of origin, the official notification of this
delivery often reaches the national inspection service after the
products have been unloaded, It is thus impossible to guarantee
that their destination has been that which had been intended.
T6
c) The authorities receiving a request for information sometimes fail
to inform the applicant authorities of inspections and the action
taken in their wake, or else do so late or incompletely.
d) The instructions for collecting official samples and sending them
to the requesting Member States within the framework of
cooperation between competent authorities provided for in
Regulation (EEC) No. 2347191 are not always followed.
Exchanges of samples are often delayed because requests are not
sufficiently precise or are not duly justified.
e) The procedures for information exchange between the liaison
authority and control authorities of the same country are not
properly defined in some of the Member States. This gives rise to
additional administrative delavs in the settlement of bilateral
disputes.
f) The Commission services do not always receive copies of the
national authorities' correspondence with each other under mutual
assislance.
g) The possibility of having national inspectors participate in
verifications in other Member States has never been used because
of linguistic, financial and/or administrative barriers (for example,
in the reporting of violations).
In respect to methods of analysis, it has to be said that the method for
detecting the watering down of wines by determination of the oxygen
isotope ratio by mass spectrometry (SMRI) is still in an experimental
phase. At present, its results can be interpreted differently by the Member
States because of the absence of an EU- or internationally-approved
official method and the limited number of reference values obtained for
genuine products.
It is urgent that the Commission and Member States concerned take steps
to adopt common rules on the method of analysis and inteqpretation of
results so as to avoid technical barriers to the free movement of
wine-sector products.
Indeed, in those cases where official analytical methods have been
established to determine the presence of specific subslances in wines but
maximum allowed levels have not been set or comparative tables of the
analytical data have not been compiled by either Community legislation
or the International Vine and Wine Office (IWO), it has come about that
the same test results have been given significantly different interpretations
by the control authorities of different Member States. This is the case for
most of the disputes mentioned in this docurnent.
Consequently, the same wine-sector product may be considered legal in
one Member State and illegal in another Member State even though the
t7
two Member States' inspection serv.ices apply the same assay method andobtain the same results.
The explanation for such a situation lies in the provisions of Article 74 ofRegulation (EEC) No. g22lg7 authorizing the ruemuei States ro applytheir own methods of analysis for substances characteristic of specificoenological practices if such methods have not u"en .stuolished by theCommunity.
The. community has yet to set such criteria. In the interim, in order toavoid contradictory situations, the Management committee for wines has
approved a declaration urging the controi authorities to take a ,position ofprudence' in such situations and to consult scientists with competence inthe area.
5. CoNcr,usroNs
1.
2.
3.
The wine sector is characterized by a comprex structure that is governedby very detailed regurations 
.ou.ring alr ficets of the sector (vineyards,
wine-making, intervention measuresl, markteing of goods, ;j. 'Td;
regulations are based on the Member states' traaiionaipractrces. The waythe sector has been organized administrativery in 
"u.t wine-producingMember State reflects this complexity.
The wine-sector rules are particularly vulnerable to irregularities becauseof the complexity of the sector and ihe regulations themselves as well asthe special nature of the products. The result of this reguratory maze.isthat efficacious verification of compriance is hard to achieve.
The community body of specific officiars for contrors in the wine-sectorthat was instituted by_Reguration (EI3c) No. 204glg9 has not met theCouncil's objectives' The difficulties it lras encountered are linked to theprecarious st'atus of its personnel and the small nurL., of officialsassigned. This situation was admittedly improved uy u ol.irion to assignpermanent staff to.,h._co_*"unity coitrol body 1to tt,, detriment of theother activities of the EAGGF). I; any case, the number of officiars wasreduced to two.
seventy-three missions were carried out during the period covered by thisreport. The main s'bjects of inr,'estigattn were the permanent
abandonment of vineyards, harvest and pr:oJu.tion'J.lurutions, hectareyl*lqt of quality wines psr, enrichment, and estimates of productionyields. These missions reveared loopholes in ,.nuin ,fiuiutionr, possibleflaws 
. 
in, 
.the inspections organized by certain M;;;, Stares, andirregularities. - J
cooperation with the Member states' control authorities was generailyharmonious and productive.
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5.
National wine-sector control structures differ considerably from one
Member State to the next. Usually, a variety of authorities is the rule,
with managerial and investigative powers being shared, sometimes
overlapping. Only rarely are the authorities specialized in the wine sector.
Practical problems continue to dog cooperation between the national
authorities responsible for conducting controls as well as between the
national authorities and the Commission. These problems basically have
to do with the lack of precision in communications and information
requests, in the case of the return of products that do not conform to
Community wine-sector rules the failure to follow sample collection
procedures, the slowness of information exchange between the liaison
authority and the control authorities, and the assay methods themselves,
as the interpretation of their results gives rise to diverging conclusions
resulting from a lack of bilaterally- and/or Community-approved reference
values.
The Member States, on the other hand, have been extremely slow about
rendering their vineyard registers fully operational. One Member State has
not even begun to set up its register. What is more, where the vineyard
register is available, even if only partially, it is not used enough to
improve the reliability of controls. The EAGGF will commission in 1995,
using external staff (provided that funds are available), a complete,
detailed audit of the progress made in implementing the vineyard register
in all the Member States.
Finally, the regulatory framework must be simplified, for it is obvious
that the less complicated the regulations, the more effective controls will
be. That was the position taken by the Commission in rts 22 July 1993
communication to the Council about the reform of the COM in wine.
6.
7.
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ANNEX I
LTsT oF MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE COMIAUNITY CONTROL
BODY DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE REPORT
U5lr992 - 3U1211992
No. DATE COUNTRY/REGION PURPOSE
1 5t5t92 BELGIUM/BRUSSELS Labelling of wines
2 7t5t92 BELGIUM/BRUSSELS Labelling of wines
3 1 1-15/5 SPAIN/RIOJA Illicit plantings
4 n-15t5 PORTUGAL/LISBON Permanent abandonment
5 t8-22t5 FRANCE/VAUCLUSE-
DROME
Registers, illicit plantings
6 I8-22t5 UNITED-KINGDOM/LONDON Labelling of wines
7 2U5 BELGIUM Labelling of wines
8 r-sl6 ITALY/SICLY Illicit plantings
9 2-5t6 GERMANY/RHINELAND-
PALATINATE
Distillation
10 8-r2t6 PORTUGAL/LISBON Distillation
11 r8-20t6 LUXEMBOURG Permanent abandonment
12 2916-3t7 SPAIN/RIOJA Illicit plantings
13 14-1717 ITALY/TUSCANY Permanent abandonment
I4 20-23t7 IRELAND/DUBLIN Registers, labelling of wines
15 24t7 UNITED
KINGDOM/LONDON
Registers, labelling of wines
I6 3U8-4t9 FRANCE/DROME, Illicit plantings
T7 3U8-6t9 ITALY/EMILIA-ROMAGNA Presumed watered-down wines
18 L4-18/9 GREECE/CRETE Harvest inspections
t9 t4-18t9 SPAIN/JEREZ Harvest inspections
20 20-30t9 ITALY/SICILY Harvest inspections
2l 5-8/10 PORTUGAL/DOURO Harvest inspections
20
22 19-23tt0 FRANCE/ALSACE Harvest inspections
23 20-22tr0 GERMANY/AHR-
MIDDLERHINE
Harvest inspections
24 26-30tr0 SPAIN/BARCELONA Enrichment
25 16lLr ITALY/ASTI Wine laboratorv visit
26 r6-20trL FRANCE/BEAUJOLAIS Harvest inspections
27 23ttt BELGIUM Labelling of wines
28 25-26n1 LUXEMBOURG Accompanying documents, registres
29 30111,-4t12 GERMANY/HESSEN Registers
30 2/t2 NETHERLANDS/
EINDHOVEN
Accompanying documents, labelling
of wines
31 7trz ITALY/APULIA Distillation
32 9-1U12 DENMARK/SVENDBORG Registers, Labelling of wines
33 14-18n2 SPAIN/LA MANCHA Distillation
34 I4-t8t12 FRANCE/CHARENTES Article 36 wines
uvr993 - 3U12n993
No. DATE COUNTRY/REGION PURPOSE
I TI.15II GERMANY/RHINELAND-
PALATINATE
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929t87\
2 t-5t2 SPAIN/LA MANCHA Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929t87\
3 8-Iv2 FRANCE/LANGUEDOC Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929/87)
4 8:1212 PORTUGAL/RIBATEJO Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929t87)
5 22-26t2 GREECE/ATTIKA Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929t87)
6 23-26t2 FRANCE/PROVENCE Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929187)
7 r-5t3 ITALY/EMILIA.
ROMAGNA
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929t87\
8 r-5t3 GERMANY/SAXONY--
SACHSEN-ANHALT
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929t87\
2l
9 15-r9t3 SPAIN/PENEDES Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929t87)
10 16-1913 ITALY/VENETIA Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No.
3929t87)
11 24t3 BELGIUM Wine laboratory visit
L2 2r-2313 NETHERLANDS/THE
HAGUE-AMSTERDAM
Registers, labelling of wines
13 3-7t5 GERMANY/SARRE-
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE
Accompanying documents,
labelling of wines, vineyard
reeister
L4 t7 t5 NETHERLANDS/THE
HAGUE.AMSTERDAM
Reimportation of alcohol
15 23-28t5 SPAIN/VALENCIA Permanent abandonment
t6 2r-25t6 PORTUGAL/BEIRA Permanent abandonment
T7 28t6-2t7 FRANCE/LANGUEDOC Permanent abandonment
18 t9-23t7 GREECE/CORINTH Permanent abandonment
19 6-10t9 FRANCE/GARD Stock declarations, storage aids
20 7-9t9 GERMANY/
WURZBURG
German inspectors' annual meeting
2T 16-17 t9 ITALY/NAPLES Utilization of alcohol
22 20-2419 PORTUGAL/RIBATEIO Stock declarations. storase aids
23 27 t9-1Jrc ITALY/EMILIA-
ROMAGNA-VENETIA
Stock declarations. storase aids
24 10-15/10 GREECE/CHALKIS-
CORINTH
Enrichment
25 15-19t11 ITALY/CALABRIA Permanent abandonment
1t1t1994 - 3llt2lt994
No. DATE COUNTRY/REGION PURPOSE
I 2r-25t2 ITALY/TUSCANY Accompanying documents
2 I4-t8t3 ITALY/ABRUZZI Inspection of a cooperative
aJ 2t-25t3 SPAIN/
CASTILLA LEON
Accompanying documents
4 27-29t4 FRANCE/
SUZE-LA-ROUSSE
Seminar: 'Vine and Wine Law'
22
5 3At4-3t5 PORTUGAL/MADEIRA Accompanying documents
6 8-9/8 ITALY/ISPRA NMR data bank
7 16-19t8 FRANCE/BEAUJOLAIS Yield estimates
8 22-26t8 PORTUGAL/DAO Yield estimates
9 19-23t9 ITALY/PIEDMONT Yield estimates
10 t0-14n0 ITALY/EMILIA_
ROMAGNA
Enrichment
11 t4-r8trr GRECE/BEOTIA Grubbing up & replanting
L2 22-23nL GERMANY/BREMEN German inspectors' anual meeting
13 l,6l12 ITALY/ISPRA Assessment of pollen spread-based
yield estimate method
L4 19-20n2 ITALY/ROME Vineyard register
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1. VrnnrcarroN oF pERI\,IANENT ABANDoNMENT oF GRApE \TNES
1.1.
ANNEX II
SunJncrs covERED By rnp CotvtMUNITy coNTRoL BoDy
DURING TITE PERIOD COVERED BY THE REPORT
The Community framework
1. The major structural imbalance in the wine-sector market has made
the adoption of measures to bring production down in line with
demand essential. To this end, a policy to reduce the wine-making
potential was set up. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1442188 of 24
May 1988r and Commission Regulation (EEC) 2729188 of 31
August 19882 set up a permanent abandonment premium scheme
in respect of vineyards for the 1988/89 to 1995196 wine years
inclusive. The vineyard owners who benefit from this premium
give up their right to replant grape vines following their
grubbing-up and had the possibility of benefiting, until the 1992193
wine year, from a preferential scheme of compulsory distillation
of table wines as of the wine year following the one in which their
vines were grubbed up.
2. Vineyards of all categories are eligible for the permanent
abandonment premiums. Exclusions were adopted for certain size
categories because of their small size, a history of infringements,
planting dates or their state of neglect. In addition, the Member
States are free to exclude from the scope of the measure specific
'protected areas'
3. The amount of the permanent abandonment premium per hectare
varies according to the type of production, the productivity of the
grubbed land, and the Member State.3 Up to and including the
1992193 wine year the premium was increased if the land
abandoned permanently accountecl for the farmer's total vineyard
acreage. Starting with the 1993194 wine year the premium is
supplemented if the grubbing-up is part of a vineyard restructuring
programme.
roJ No L r32,
2oJ No L 241,
3The premiums
28.5.1988, p. 3.
1.9.1988, p. 108.
are lower in Portugal.
aAL+
1.2. Remarks
The limited availability of the means of control seems to be the
greatest obstacle to the correct application of the permanent
abandonment programme. lfhe material difficulties of setting up
far-reaching, systematic checks before and after grubbing are such
that the conditions for granting the premiums are not verified
strictly. The Court of Auditors has drawn attention to this in its
annual reports. The Member: States must give this problem serious
consideration if it is to be solved.
The national arrangements made to manage and control the
scheme's application do not meet all of the Community's
requirements. Sharing knowledge of the various measures taken in
the Member States may help the national officials to improve their
own measures.
Inspections of the plots scheduled for grubbing should be
conducted preferably during the vine's vegetative growth period or
at least before the vines are pruned so as to gauge better the crop's
vigour and thus its potential yield.
In Spain, Italy and Portugal the acreages or yields per hectare of
the plots scheduled for grubbing were wittingly overestimated.
Additional guarantees had to be introduced to avoid this risk. The
figures in the wine-growers' annual harvest and production
declarations had to be taken into account by the inspection services
in all cases. The regulation was amended accordingly in 1993.1
The time limit for the completion of grubbing (15 May) led to
delays in dealing with demands and with payment. In addition,
official confirmation of grubbing within two months of notification
proved impossible in regions where large areas were grubbed up
under the premium scheme, due to shortage of control staff. The
time limit for grubbing and the two month confirmation period had
to be extended. In 1993 the regulation was amended to take acount
of the second pointt.
In France, Greece and Italy some cases of grubbing up that have
been certified as complying with the rules have not always led to
the complete elimination of the vine stocks due to the failure to
pull up main roots and wood left lying around on the plots. The
definition of grubbing-up given in the Regulation was clarified in
lgg31.
7. Eligibility for an additional premium if the applicant's entire
vineyard is grubbed up is very difficult to check. The lack of
lCouncil Regulation (EEC) No
24.7.1993, p. 7).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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1990193 of 19 July 1993 (OJ No L 182,
8.
sufficient information about the farms does not permit the
competent services to be certain that the abandonment is total.
Under these conditions, granting an additional premium for total
abandonment is not justified. This additional premium was
discontinued in 1993.1
Setting up a full, computerized vineyard register would allow to
correct a large portion of the current failings. Using such a tool
would make it possible, amongst other things, to improve the
management and preventive inspection of requests, check vineyard
composition and manage wine-growers' replanting rights. In the
interim, the inspection services should use the vineyard files and
the viticultural land registers - even where incomplete - that exist
in some regions.
tCouncil Regulation (EEC) No
24.7.1993, p. 7).
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1990193 of 19 July 1993 (OJ No L 182,
2. VTnmCITTON OF HARVEST AND PRODUCTION DECLARATIONS
2.L. The Community framework
1. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3g2gl87 of 17 December
t987r provides for annual declarations of harvests, production and
stocks in the wine sector. These provisions may be considered the
basic instrument for managing and monitoring the wine sector
given the importance of the information they provide, including
particulars of each individual operator and information about the
sector as a whole.
The importance of these provisions as a basic legal instrument
prompted the legislator to provide for Community sanctions
(Article 11 of the Regulation) against operators who do not submit
their declarations or fill them in incorrectly. These sanctions
consist in exclusion from all voluntarv market measures for two
wine years.
2. Concerning table wine market management, the Member States
calculate each operator's rights and distillation obligations from the
. production figures, the wine-growing areas where the products
come from, and yields per hectare declared annually. What is
more, the annual harvest and production declarations are the
quality wines psr's 'birth certificates' and indispensable tools to
ensure that the operators cornply with national and Community
provisions regarding quality rvines.
2.2. Remarks
According to the Conrmunity control body's findings, Regulation
(EEC) No. 3929187 as currently drafted is a weak basis for
collecting reliable information about the areas in production and
yields per hectare of table wines and quality wines psr obtained by
the operators. Gaps and vague wording in the text have had as a
consequence that each Member State set up its own system of
declarations, sometimes correcting some of the deficiencies in the
Community regulation. The Regulation is full of inadequacies.
The difficulties surrounding grape harvest declarations stem mainly
from the following:
a) The lack of precise criteria for defining the vineyards that
are subject to the rights and obligations entailed by the
COM. Consequently, wherever the vineyard register is not
toJ No 'l;,- 369, 29.r2.1987, p. 59.
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yet operational, the inspection services are not in a position
to know all of the wine growers that are required to
declare their. grape harvests and thus to enforce this
obligation.
Derogations from the requirement to submit harvest
declarations, especially the exemption for the members of
wine cooperatives and members of groups of wine
producers. In the absence of individual harvest
declarations, the wine-makers for whom the grapes are
intended can easily change the surface areas of origin and
thus the yields of the. various categories or types of wines.
The regulation's omission of harvesting centres that buy
grapes from harvesters and resell the must to wine-makers
before 15 December. Since these intermediaries are not
bound to make any declaration, they form a screen between
the harvesters and wine-makers and can manipulate, that is,
lower, the yield figures at will when delivering must to the
wine-makers.
The non-obligation to declare the registered plots from
which the grapes are harvested. In the absence of a
vineyard register giving a true picture of the composition
of the growers' vineyards, this omission prevents
verification of the total area declared under vines and thus
of actual yields.
The obligation, which has since been abolishedr, to declare
harvested yields in equivalent volumes of wine
(hectolitres/hectare) instead of by weight of grapes
(quintals/hectare). There was no way for harvesters who
did not make their own wine to know the grape-to-wine
transfonnation coefficients attained by the wine-makers to
whom they delivered their grapes. It thus followed that the
yield figures that tlie harvesters supplied with their
deliveries to tlie wineries were always rough figures and
when the wine-makers deduced frorn these figures the
acreages corresponding to the grapes, those figures were
likewise inaccurate.
Wine production declaration problems arise when the weighted
average yields of the grapes being vinified has to be determined,
which, by deflnition, must correspond to the average yield of the
wine-maker who makes wine out of his own grape harvest or
purchased grapes. The wine-maker must take into consideration
lCommission Regulation (EEC) No 1991/94,27 Jvly 1994 (OJ No L 200,
3.8.1994, p. 10).
b)
2.
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a)
and declare as many weighted average yields as the different
categories of products he produces (table wipes, quality wines psr,
and other wines).
The difficulties stem from ther following:
To be able to calculate the weighted average yield, the
wine-maker must know the exact figures of both the
quantities of the various batches of grapes or must he uses
and the acreages from which they originate.
If the winery is not a grape producer as well, it is
completely dependent on its suppliers' stated yields per
hectare to calculate the acreages corresponding to its
deliveries.
The difficulties mentioned in Item 2 above often lead to
inaccuracies in the surlace areas under production and thus
the non-compliance of the wine production declaration, for
an error in the acreage attributed to one of the deliveries is
enough to make the winery's weighted average yield
wrong, too.
According to the wine production declaration given in
Table B of Annex I of Regulation (EEC) No. 3929187, the
weighted average yield concerns all of the products
upstream from the wine (grapes and must) used by the
producer. These include the products that have been
vinified since the start of the wine year as well as those
present in the winery's holdings at the date of the
declaration, even if the latter have not been vinified.
What is more, pursuant to the provisions of Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 441l88 of l7 February 1988 laying
down the rules for the application of the compulsory
distillation of table rvinesr, the producer's distillation
obligation is calculated frorn his weighted average yield of
products upstream from the table wine. Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 2587/94 of 25 October 19942
stipulates that in the case of vinification of purchased
products, only the batches that have actually been made
into wine are included in the calculation of the averase
yield.
Quality wines psr declaration
Knowing and controling harvesters and wine-makers' harvests and
production of quality wines psr on the basis of their declarations
b)
3.
toJ No L 45, 18.2.1988, p. 15.
2oJ No L 274,26.10.1994, p. 2,
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alone is diff,rcult, for the Community system of declarations makes
no allowance for the specific properties of these products.
Thus, the total harvest and production figures - all designations
and products taken together - are supposed to be declared, with an
indication of the average yield per hectare. In fact, no place is
even provided for the name(s) of the designated wine(s) the
declarer may claim to harvest/produce.
Managing and verifying the quality wine sector requires that the
harvest/production be broken down by designation of origin and
even within a given designation by type of product, according to
the colour, vine variety or production subzone that is claimed.
Splitting the amounts into those for which the designation of origin
is claimed and those that the declarer has downgraded to table
wines is necessary because different production rules, such as
ceilings on yields per hectare or grape-to-wine transformation
coefficients, apply to the various designations and products.
Lacking the above detailed information, the Community harvest
and production declarations are not useful tools for managing and
monitoring quality wines. At the limit, the overall figures that are
declared are of statistical value only.
Aware of this limitation, some Member States have adopted
different harvest/production declaration systems from that of the
Community. Their approaches have been either to adapt the
declarations to the needs of quality wines psr (France) or to design
additional declarations for the services responsible for checking
quality wines (Spain, Italy) so that the producers can put forward
their claims of quality and the competent services can check
observance of the conditions for producing and marketing quality
wines psr. Still, the existence of separate national declarations for
quality wines psr is a duplication of the Community declarations,
which should suffice as a means of meeting the COM's declaration
needs. Moreover, the two sets of declarations do not always take
the same administrative path and not all the services responsible
for controls get copies.
For the sake of simplicity and el'ficacy, the Cornmunity
declarations should be adapted to allow for the particr"rlar needs of
the quality wine psr sector.
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3. Qulurv wrNE psR yrELDs pER ITEcTARE
3.1. The Community framework
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 823/87 of 16 March 1987t contains the
rules governing quality wines psr. Its fifteenth recital reads, 'Whereas, in
order to maintain the quality standard of the wines in question and to
avoid excessive yields liable to disrupt the Market, Member States should
fix a maximum yield per hectare for each quality wine psr;...'.
Consequently, Article 11(1) states, 'A yield per hectare expression in
quantities of grapes, of grape must or of wine shall be fixed for each
quality wine psr by the Member State concerned' and paragnph 2
specifies 'Use of the designation claimed shall be prohibited for the entire
harvest if the yield referred to in paragraph 1 is exceeded, save where
derogations are provided for, on a general or individual basis, by Member
States under conditions which thel' s6u11 lay down, if appropriate,
according to wine-growing area; these conditions shall relate in particular
to the use to which the wines or products in question are to be put.'
The Court of Justice, responding to a request of interpretation2, ruled that
said Article 11 had to be interpreted to the effect that, in any event, no
wine above the yield per hectare set by the Member State might be sold
as a quality wine produced in a specified region (quality wine psr).
3.2. Remarks
All the producer Member States have taken steps to limit the yields per
hectare of quality wines psr. The maximum yiglds are as a rule set for
each production zone and, within these areas, broken down by type of
wine or vine variety. The yield threr;holds are set in hl/ha or ql/ha, as
maximum grape-to-wine transformation coefficients have also been set.
However, some national provisions tend to water down the principle
according to which exceeding the maximum yield per hectare results in
the loss of the designation of origin for the entire harvest. Thus,
a) in a number of Member States (Germany, Spain, Greece,
Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal) the maximum yieids per hectare
for certain designations have been set at high levels. These levels
most likely were not set on the basis of the previous ten years'
yields, but in order to avoid exceeding the maximum yields and
thus the undesirable consequences of such a situation.
toJ No L 84, 27 .3.1987 , p. 59.2Judgement of the European Court of Justice of 2.8.1993 in Case C-
289t9t.
31
b) in some Member States (France and Italy) the maximum yield of
each designated wine may be raised (this is usually the case) or
lowered annually to allow for the particular conditions affecting
each harvest, especially climatic variations. The result is that the
maximum yields are regularly exceeded, as weather conditions are
invoked, sometimes abusively, as reasons for calling the year
'exceptional'.
c) in some Member States (France and Italy) the maximum yield per
hectare may be raised by a certain percentage (20 or 25%) and
if the harvest is such that the vineyard/winery's yield
exceeds the maximum yield but remains below the
above-mentioned additional margin only the overshoot
between the two thresholds loses the right to the
designation of origin.
if, on the contrary, the maximum yield increased by the
above-mentioned additional margin is exceeded, the
operator's entire harvest theoretically becomes ineligible
for the quality wine psr label.
There are differences between the Member States as to the
authorized uses for the products that exceed the hxed maximum
yields for quality wines psr. Thus,
in Spain, Greece and Portugal either the excess quantities
or the entire harvest must be downgraded to table wine.
in France the excess production must be delivered for
distillation if the production below the cut-off point is to
keep the right to the designation of origin.
in Italy, if an operator's harvest is between the maximum
yield and the maximum yield increased by the
above-mentioned percentage, the excess production may be
downgraded to table wines, but up to a general maximum
yield set for the vines that produce the table wines. All
other surpluses must be delivered for distillation if the right
to clairn the designation of origin for the amount that does
not exceed the maximum yield is to be retained.
finally, in the other producer Member States (Germany and
Luxembourg) the amounts that exceed the maximum yields
may be used for other pLrrposes (production of fortified
wines, wine vinegar, grape juice, sparkling wines, etc.) or
carried over to the next wine year as a quality wine psr,
provided that the following year's yield is below the
allowed maximum.
The wine cooperatives and other organizations that produce quality
wines psr have special privileges concerning limits on yields
because all of their suppliers' vineyards are added together in
d)
e)
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calculating the average yields per hectare (weighted average yields)
of the quality wines psr produced by the cooperative or
organization. Consequently, the high yields registered by some
harvesters may be offset by the poorer yields of other harvesters,
thereby making quantitative production limits on each harvester's
holding inoperative.
Finally, in several regions of Germany, both vineyard land that is
not actually planted in vines and vineyards that have not reached
full production may enter into the calculation of yields per hectare
of quality wines psr.
The above situation is complicated by' other practical problems, of which
we can mention the following:
a) the unsuitability of annual harvest and production declarations for
quality wine psr management and control.
b) the control services' ignorance of each grower's holding, given the
vague definition of the vineyard and the unavailability of the
vineyard register data, even in countries where this tool has been
set up.
c) the almost total absence of field inspections of the declared
acreages.
d) the non-existence of physical verification of the grape yields
obtained in the harvester's vineyards. Although in some
grape-producing regions in the Member States the vintages are
officially weighted as tliey arrive at the wine cooperative, this does
not guarantee that the delivered grapes come solely and entirely
from the vineyards tended by each of the operators.
e) the limited number of staff available for inspections during the
grape-picking period.
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4. Conrnor,s oN ExmcuMENT
4.1. The Community framework
1. Enrichment and the limits placed on it have been addressed by
several Community regulations..The basic provisions for all wines
are laid down in Articles 18 to 20 inclusive of Regulation (EEC)
No.822187. Special provisions for quality wines psr are contained
in Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No. 823187.
The rules for declaring, performing and verifying enrichment
operations are laid down in Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
22401891 of 25 July 1989.
2. The rules for granting aid for the utilization of concentrated grape
must (CM) and rectified concentrated must (RCM) to enrich wines
are given in Article 45 of Regulation (EEC) No. 822187 and
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 26401882 of 25 August 1988.
These aids are intended to smooth over the disparities in the costs
of the different enrichment products (sucrose versus CM or RCM)
and are granted to the users of CM or RCM according to the
amounts they use.
4.2. Remarks
1. Enriching wines by adding either sucrose (chaptalization) or CM
or RCM is a widespread practice in most of the Community's
wine-producing Member States, i.e. Germany, France, Greece,
Italy and Luxembourg.
The practice was originally a means of improving the quality of
wines where production conditions were unfavourable so as to
meet the mean level of quality demanded by consumers.
Chaptalization is often necessary on the northern borders of the
grape-growing area.
Although the regulations consider it a practice that is supposed to
remain the exception to the rule, it is actually the rule in many
vineyard regions in the Community. This spread of enrichment has
been both the cause and the result of the high yields per hectare
registered in many regions, the corollary of which has been a
considerable drop in the grapes' natural sugar content.
toJ No L 2r5, 26.7 .1989,
2oJ No L 236,26.8.1988,
p. 16.
p.20.
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2.
In addition, a side-effect of the aid granted for the use of CM or
RCM has been to encourage enrichment in regions that formerly
did not resort to this practice.
Chaptalization is banned in the Community's southern Member
States (Greece, Italy and Portugal) and the south of France. In
these countries, still wines may be enriched only by the addition
of CM or RCM. Spain is the exception to the rule; in that any
artificial augmentation of a wine's natural alcoholic strength,
whether by chaptalization or the addition of CM or RCM, is
prohibited.
In contrast, chaptalization is virtually the only. accepted enrichment
procedure in the Community's northern wine-producing countries
(Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) and the north
of France and is widely used by operators in these areas, who cite
historical or cultural reasons for the practice.
Authorized subtractive enrichment methods, such as concentration
by cooling, are barely used, fcrr they reduce the volume of wine.
Most of the wine-making Member States have taken national
measures to supervise enrichment operations through
administrative verifications, physical inspections or laboratory
analyses. They basically aim to guarantee that:
the operation has been duly declared and entered in the
accounting documents in advance;
the enriched product has the required minimum natural
alcoholic strength;
the enrichment does not exceed the imposed limits;
only authorized enrichment processes are used;
the operation is performed only once in the course of the
fermentation; and
when subsidized CM or RCM is used, the rules governing
this procedure are observed.
4. In Germany, inspections focus primarily on the superior quality
wines psr ('mit Prddikat'), for which enrichment is prohibited. In
contrast, the other quality wines psr and table wines alike undergo
few inspections in the course of their chaptalization.
The absence of advance notification of enrichment has been found
in many German regions, as well as irregular records of inputs and
the utilization of sugar for enrichment. The national authorities
feel that advance notification would create unnecessary problems
for operators and is of little use to the inspection services, since
practically all of the country's wineries resort to enrichment in the
3.
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5.
6.
post-harvesting period. In addition, the authorities accept the
enrichment operations to be entered in the wineries' registers after
15 Decernber instead of prior to this date, as required by law.
In Spain, all enrichment operations are prohibited. However, only
few ad hoc inspections to discover possible illicit enrichment are
conducted. The inspection services tolerate enrichment operations
to a certain extent when unusual weather conditions adversely
affect the harvest, making enrichment necessary.
In France, where both enrichment methods are practised,
depending on the region, random and targeted physical
spot-controls of wine-making operations are carried out by three
inspection services. However, given the large number of producers
who resort to enrichment, the inspectors manage to check only a
very small fraction of all the operations.
The obligations to provide advance notification of and register
enrichment operations seem to be met by French operators. Still,
producers' organizations in a number of regions have called for
relaxation of the rules governing chaptalization, for instance, the
obligation to submit advance notification prior to each input of
sugar and the ban on fractionated enrichment. Many operators
have followed the organizations' orders and make only one
comprehensive enrichment declaration for the entire wine-year
prior to the first enrichment operation. Fractionated enrichment,
for its part, is practised widely in one French region.
The national authorities are opposed to allowing a single total
enrichment declaration at the start of the wine year but have
welcomed the idea of careful examination of the possibility of
implementing fractionated enrichment because of its oenological
merits, the ultimate airn being to have a suitable regulatory
framework.
In Greece, physical inspections of enrichment during wine-making
operations are conducted systematically by two inspection services.
The operation may not be performed without an inspector present.
Samples of the must to be enriched, the concentrated must or
rectified concehtrated must that is used and the wine after
fermentation are collected systematically. Both advance
declarations of enrichrnent and official laboratory reports
concerning all the operations are requirecl for the payment of aid
for the utilization of concentrated grape must or rectified
concentrated must.
7.
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8. In Italy, random and targeted spot checks of enrichment during
operations are performed by two inspection services. The national
provisions conform to Community provisions in this area.
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5. Vnqnynnn YTELD ESTIMATION
5.1. Introduction
The reform of the COM in wine that is currently being discussed by the
Council attaches considerable importance to the problem of controlling
production yields. Lowering the yields per hectare, with compensation for
the loss of income resulting from the drop in production (Aspect A of the
future regional viticultural adaptation programmes), is one of the methods
foreseen to achieve this aim.
Three missions to evaluate on site a method for estimating the yields of
individual plots and the entire region several weeks before harvesting
were carried out, one in the Beaujolais region (France), one in Dao
(Portugal), and one in Piedmont (Italy).
The regions in which the methods were tested were chosen because of
their diverse characteristics (vine varieties, designations, experience in
vintage forecasting, vineyard layout, etc.) and various degrees of
availability of statistics (vineyard register) so as to have a selection of
regions presenting different problems for the evaluation exercis.e.
5.2. The yield estirnation methods used
According to the information available at the time of the missions, two
methods for estimating yields are used routinely.
5.2.1. The "Beaujolais vnethod" .
The yield estimation method used in the Beaujolais region is based on the
sampling of bunches of grapes in the vineyard.
The plot's estimated yield is extrapolated from the samples' weights and
the number of bunches counted for each vine that is sampled.
5.2.2. The "Swiss ntetllod"
This method was developed by the Changins Federal Agricultural
Research Station (Nyons) and is likewise based on grape sampling.
It consists in determining first the aver.rge number of bunches for five
groups of 10 consecutive vines, then the number of set grapes in an
average bunch for 10 vine stocks taken at random.
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5.3. Remarks
The counts made during these missions likewise showed up a certain
number of difficulties inherent in making such an estimate.
The first problem concerns weather conditions, which are always
unpredictable and can have a major impact on forecasts. For example, a
hail storm can destroy a vineyard's entire crop between the date of
estimation and harvesting.
Inversely, rain can inflate the estimate, if rainfall is heavy at the time of
sampling, or the harvest, if rainfall is heavy at grape-picking time.
Actual production can also be modifie.d if the grower decides not to pick
all of the grapes on the plot, but sort the vintage according to specific
criteria of quality. However, this praotice is still little used.
Choosing which plots are representative of a region is a difficult task.
The situation, size, cropping method, vine maintenance, vine age,
grower's concern for quality, etc., are all factors that must be given
careful consideration to avoid giving too much weight to any one factor
and putting the subsequent extrapolation for the entire region out of
balance.
Experienced field personnel and a cornplete, yp-to-date vineyard register
are indispensable for this. However, rnost of the time the region does not
have a network of representative plots suitable as a basis for estimating
regional production or even the production of a designated area.
Setting up such a network has proved difficult because of the great many
designations that exist in some regions.
The bunch counts per vine stock are also sources of error, especially if
the operators have little training in sampling techniques. The bunches'
lack of uniformity can result in different figures, depending on the
technician who does the counting.
In taking one bunch per vine one often tends unconsciously to select a
bountiful, shapely bunch, which also tends to result in overestimation of
the plot's potential.
The Swiss method proved too fastidious for routine use, as too much time
is required to count the individr.ral grapes. on the other hand, counting the
number of bunches in a sample of 50 vine stocks seems to be necessary
to allow for the diversity that characterizes most vineyards. The remarks
about bunch counts and selection that were made with respect to the
Beaujolais method apply here, too.
Knowledge of the factor of growth c:orresponding to the lapse of time
between the moment of estimation and harvesting is another source of
error. However, even estimates made close to the harvest period were no
better than the others.
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Plot sampling has often been hampered by inaccuracies in the statistics.
For example, the plots had sometimes been cleared or the vineyard's
actual composition was different from the reported composition. In
addition, statistics concerning the number of missing vines were seldom
updated.
Given all these complications, the estimates made during the missions and
actual production were found to diverge greatly. If the actual harvest
figures supplied to the Commission are reliable, most of the estimates are
off by more than 20% $oth under- and overestimation).
5.4. Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the exercise conducted
during the previous wine year:
The plot estimates tend to be higher than the yields actually measured at
harvest time.
As a rule of thumb, the margin of error in the estimated yield of a
homogeneous plot is in the 10- to 30-percent range.
It is difficult to estimate a grower's entire yield if his vineyards do not
consist of similar, homogeneous plots.
In theory, such estimates require estimation of the yields of all the land
under cultivation. This is not feasible for most operations, which consist
of various plots that are usually charucterized by different conditions
(exposure, vine age, vine variety, designation, slope, etc.).
However, the inaccuracies of the individual estimates for each plot make
total tineyard estimates even less reliable.
When it comes to an entire region, estimates will be strongly dependent
on the representativeness of the plots that are selected.
The JRC in Ispra'is currently working on a yield-forecasting method
based on a pollen count. The principle is to predict yields on the basis of
a pollen count at flowering and a historical relationship between the
amount of pollen released at flowering and the actual yield at harvesting.
The amount of pollen that is disseminated during flowering is greatly
influenced by weather conditions during flowering; it also depends on
such additional factors as the size of the vineyard and the number of
inflorescences at flowering, which can be greatly reduced by events prior
to flowering, snch as adverse weather conditions (spring frosts or hail) or
infestation by parasites.
This method also suffers from some financial and technical drawbacks that
will make it difficult to apply Commr,rnity-wide.
At this stage we can already conclude that verifying the estimated losses
of income that would result from voluntary reductions in production yields
such as proposed in the draft reform of the COM in wine would be
difficult.
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If such a measure is maintained in the new COM in wine, we recommend
making it verifiable. This could be done, for example, by making it more
Draconian, that is to say, by subsidizing only a total reduction in a plot's
outputt based on the region's historical average yield (or the average yield
of the vineyard operation, based on its harvest declarations).
It would then "suffice" simply to check for the absence of a production
on the plot or plots that the operator agreed not to use for production. We
must, however, admit that this measure runs counter to a certain peasant
mentality that is avgrse to wasting the fruit of the vine.
Another disadvantage of this all-or-nothing measure concerns the
producers, who, being mindful of the quality of their wines and having
already resorted to (partial) green cropping to increase the sugar
concentrations in the bunches that remain on the vine, would not be
eligible to subsidies, since the thinning would not be total. However, the
amount of this loss would probably be insignificant compared with the
price of the quality wine that would be produced.
On the other hand, this measure does have the additional advantage of
keeping plant cover in vine-growing areas such as La Mancha that are
vulnerable to the risk of erosion.
For the sake of completeness, we must point out that intermediate
measures, such as weighing a partial green crop, limiting the number of
bunches per vine stock, etc., may be considered.
Whilst such measures appear possible in theory, in practice they pose once
again the problem of effective controll.
rThis means practising total green cropping, that is, harvesting the entire
plot before'the grapes ripen so that they cannot be vinified fraudently.
With regard to the compensation for the commensurate loss of income that
is currently being considered in the draft reform, this measure will likely
interest cheap table-wine producers only, that is to say, precisely those
wine-makers who are responsible for the sulpluses that the Community is
trying to eliminate.
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